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19811 CASE NOTES
Patent Law-PROCESS PATENTS-SUBJECT MATTER PATENTABIL-
iTY-A PATENT CLAIM BASED PRIMARILY ON A COMPUTER PROGRAM
CAN COMPRISE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER-Diamond v. Diehr,
101 S. Ct. 1048 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
Can a computer program be patented?1 The computer software
industry has been awaiting an answer to this question.2 In Dia-
mond v. Diehr,5 the United States Supreme Court declined the
opportunity to give a definitive answer.'
Instead, the Court in Diehr approved a test for determining pat-
entable subject matter in computer program related claim applica-
tions which is relatively liberal in favor of patentability. Specifi-
cally, the Court approved a claim, filed by respondents Diehr and
Lutton,8 in which a digital computer program figured prominently,
on the basis that it constituted patentable subject matter under 35
1. This area of the law has been much commented on over the last decade. See, e.g.,
Blumenthal & Riter, Statutory or Non-Statutory?: An Analysis of the Patentability of
Computer Related Inventions, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 454 (1980); Davis, Computer Programs
and Subject Matter Patentability, 6 RuT. J. COMPUTERS L. 1 (1977); Gemignani, Legal Pro-
tection for Computer Software; The View from '79, 7 RuT. J. COMPUTERS TECH. L. 269
(1980); Nimtz, Development of the Law of Computer Software Protection, 61 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 3 (1979); Novick & Wallenstein, The Algorithm and Computer Software Patentabil-
ity: A Scientific View of a Legal Problem, 7 RuT. J. CoMPUTERS TECH. L. 313 (1980); Pfeifer,
Legal Protection of Computer Software: An Update, 5 ORANGE CouNTY B.J. 226 (1978);
Pope & Pope, Protection of Proprietary Interests in Computer Software, 30 ALA. L. REV.
527 (1979); Ross, The Patentability of Computer "Firmware", 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 731
(1977); Upchurch, A Template for Judicial Resolution of Computer Program Patentability,
9 GA. L. REV. 855 (1975); 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 835 (1977); 26 DRAKE L. REV. 180 (1976-77); 58
N.C.L. REV. 319 (1980).
2. The term software is generic and can be thought of as synonymous with the term
computer program for purposes of this note.
A traditional dichotomy has been drawn in computer science between "hard-
ware" and "software." Hardware can be defined as the collection of physical com-
ponents and apparatus that make up a computer system, whereas software con-
sists of the information (data) and instructions for processing this data (programs)
fed into the computer, on which it operates.
Ross, supra note 1 at 736 (footnote omitted).
3. 101 S. Ct. 1048 (1981). Petitioner, Sidney A. Diamond, is Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks.
4. The Court has had three previous opportunities to decide this issue but in each case
the Court kept its holding more narrow. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Dann v.
Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). Johnston was de-
cided on grounds other than subject matter patentability. Benson and Flook are discussed
at the text accompanying notes 53-73, infra.
5. James R. Diehr, II and Theodore A. Lutton filed the patent application involved in
this case. 101 S. Ct. at 1048.
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U.S.C. § 101 (section 101)." In taking this step towards favoring
patentability for software, the Court reverses the position it took
in Parker v. Flook7 only three years ago. Although Diehr purports
to distinguish Flook,8 the rationales of the two cases are
irreconcilable. 9
This note will discuss the evolution of the Diehr case, review the
historical background of the decision, and finally will focus on an
analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions in Diehr and the
effect this decision may have.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE CASE
Diehr and Lutton filed a patent application on August 6, 1975
claiming the invention of a new process for curing synthetic rub-
ber.10 Simply stated, "[t]he process uses a mold for precisely shap-
ing the uncured material under heat and pressure and then curing
the synthetic rubber in the mold so that the product will retain its
shape and be functionally operative after the molding is com-
pleted." ' Curing rubber in this way is common in the industry and
the chemistry and physics of this process are governed by the Ar-
rhenius equation.1" The more accurately the variables in this equa-
6. (1976). Section 101 defines what subject matter is patentable. It states: "Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title."
Once a patent application is determined to define patentable subject matter under section
101 it must still pass the hurdles imposed by other sections of Title 35 in order to be
granted a patent. Primary among these other hurdles are sections 102 and 103 which deal
with questions of whether the claimed invention or discovery is novel and nonobvious. See
note 30 infra. The questions posed by sections 102 and 103, however, are to be considered
separately from the question of whether the subject matter is patentable under section 101.
In Diehr the Court is concerned only with the section 101 inquiry, i.e., whether the patent
application defines patentable subject matter. It is unclear whether Diehr and Lutton's ap-
plication has already passed these other hurdles or must still face them before a patent will
issue. See 101 S. Ct. at 1068 n.33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
8. 101 S. Ct. at 1056 & 1059 n.14.
9. Justice Stewart wrote the dissent in Flook and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist. 437 U.S. at 584. The Diehr majority opinion was written by Justice
Rehnquist and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Powell. 101
S. Ct. at 1048.
10. 101 S. Ct. at 1051.
11. Id. (footnote omitted).
12. In re Diehr, 620 F.2d 982, 983 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Diamond v. Diehr, 101
S. Ct. 1048 (1981). Diamond v. Diehr explains:
The equation is named after its discoverer Svante Arrhenius and has long been
used to calculate the cure time in rubber molding presses. The equation can be
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tion can be controlled, the better the cure, and hence, the better
the product.'3 One important variable in the equation which, ac-
cording to Diehr and Lutton, was not adequately controlled in the
traditional method was temperature." In the traditional method
the temperature of the mold press, which is apparently set at a
fixed temperature and is controlled by thermostat,5 fluctuates due
to the opening and closing of the press.' 6 Because the Arrhenius
equation is calculated using an average anticipated temperature,
and the calculated time for the mold to open varies with the tem-
perature approximation, the rubber is overcured or undercured
when the actual temperature of the mold press varies.'7
Diehr and Lutton had developed a different method:
Respondents characterize their contribution to the art to reside
in the process of constantly measuring the actual temperature in-
side the mold. These temperature measurements are then auto-
matically fed into a computer which repeatedly recalculates the
cure time by use of the Arrhenius equation. When the recalcu-
lated time equals the actual time that has elapsed since the press
was closed, the computer signals a device to open the press. Ac-
cording to the respondents, the continuous measuring of the tem-
perature inside the mold cavity, the feeding of this information to
a digital computer which constantly recalculates the cure time,
and the signaling by the computer to open the press, are all new
in the art.18
Although Diehr and Lutton claimed only the above process to be
new to the art, at least one of their claims recited the entire pro-
cess of curing rubber, i.e., from putting uncured rubber in a heated
expressed as follows:
In v = CZ + x
where In v is the natural logarithm of v, the total required cure time; C is the
activation constant, a unique figure for each batch of each compound being
molded, determined in accordance with rheometer measurements of each batch; Z
is the temperature in the mold; and x is a constant dependent on the geometry of
the particular mold in the press. A rheometer is an instrument to measure flow of
viscous substances.
101 S. Ct. at 1052 n.2.
13. 101 S. Ct. at 1052.
14. Id.
15. 602 F.2d at 983.
16. 101 S. Ct. at 1052 n.3.
17. Id. at 1052. 602 F.2d at 983.
18. 101 S. Ct. at 1052.
1981]
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mold to taking out the cured product.19
The patent examiner rejected the claims because "the only non-
conventional claim steps 'define a computer program for taking
repeated temperature measurements from the mold and calculat-
ing cure time in response to said measurement data.' "20 Therefore,
the patent examiner "decided that appellants were claiming a
computer program, 'subject matter [to] which the Supreme Court
has declined to extend patent protection absent a considered ac-
tion by Congress.' ,,21
The Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals (PTO
Board) agreed with the patent examiner, 2 but the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals (CCPA) reversed.23 The CCPA found
that the Supreme Court had never held computer programs unpat-
entable subject matter per se, and furthermore, that the PTO
Board erred in dissecting the claim into old and new elements.'
The CCPA held that for purposes of section 101 "[tlhe focus of the
inquiry should be whether the claim, as a whole, is directed essen-
tially to a method of calculation or mathematical formula.' 2
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the CCPA in a five
to four decision.2' The Court agreed with the CCPA that when re-
viewing a computer program related claim to determine whether
the claim defines statutory subject matter under section 101, the
claim must be viewed as a whole, not dissected and analyzed by
parts, and that no consideration of novelty or obviousness' 7 is ap-
propriate in section 101 analysis.' 8
III. HISTOICAL BACKGROUND
Congressional authority to legislate a patent system is specifi-
19. Claim 11 recites the entire process of curing rubber. See 101 S. Ct. at 1053 n.5. In
comparison, claims 1 and 2 recite only parts of the process. Id. at 1052-53 n.5.
20. 602 F.2d at 984 (emphasis in original).
21. Id. at 984 (emphasis in original).
22. 101 S. Ct. at 1053.
23. In re Diehr, 602 F.2d at 982 (1979), aff'd sub nom. Diamond v. Diehr, 101 S. Ct. 1048
(1981).
24. 602 F.2d at 986-87. The PTO Board dissected the claim by looking at non-conven-
tional, i.e., new claim steps. See text accompanying note 20, supra.
25. Id. at 987 (emphasis in original).
26. 101 S. Ct. 1048. As noted previously, Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court. See note
9 supra. Justice Stevens wrote the dissent and was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun. Id.
27. See note 6 supra, for discussion of novelty and obviousness requirements of sections
102 and 103.
28. 101 S. Ct. at 1057.
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cally granted in the Constitution."s Current statutory legislation
relating to patents is contained in Title 35 of the United States
Code. 0 The philosophy behind the patent law is that "[tihe pro-
ductive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society
through the introduction of new products and processes of manu-
facture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased
employment and better lives for our citizens."3 "
Sections 102 and 103 of Title 35 address the novelty and nonob-
viousness of patent claims. These sections define different statu-
tory criteria from section 101. Therefore, analysis to determine
whether a claim is statutory subject matter under section 101 must
be distinguished from analysis to determine whether a claim is
novel under section 102, or obvious under section 103.32
Furthermore, although the definition of what is patentable sub-
ject matter under section 101 is broad and includes a "process" ss
as well as a "machine", there are some things which do not fall
within section 101 and therefore cannot be patented regardless of
their novelty and nonobviousness." Scientific principles, s" mathe-
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 which states: "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."
30. For purposes of this note the relevant sections are 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 101, 102, and
103. Section 101 is quoted at note 6 supra. Section 100(b) states: "The term 'process' means
process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material." Section 102 contains the criterion of novelty essential
for patentability, and section 103 contains the criterion of non-obviousness essential for pat-
entability. See note 6 supra.
31. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
32. See notes 6 & 30 supra.
33. See note 30 supra. The Court in Diehr stated:
Although the term "process" was not added to 35 U.S.C. § 101 until 1952, a
process has historically enjoyed patent protection because it was considered a
form of "art" as that term was used in the 1793 Act. In defining the nature of a
patentable process, the Court stated:
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of
the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. . . .A process is a mode of
treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a
series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be transformed and
reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patenta-
ble as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art.
The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process may or may
not be new or patentable; whilst the process itself may be altogether new,
and produce an entirely new result. The process requires that certain things
should be done with certain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools
to be used in doing this may be of secondary consequence.
101 S. Ct. at 1054-55 (quoting from Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876)) (foot-
notes omitted).
34. 101 S. Ct. at 1055.
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matic equations," ideas, 7 phenomena of nature," and generally
any naturally occurring event or abstract human thought are not
patentable subject matter.8 ' This is because they are the "basic
tools of scientific and technological work"' and it would be unfair
and contrary to the goals of the patent system to grant anyone a
monopoly on them. If, however, the idea or phenomenon is incor-
porated in a machine, or applied in a process, then the machine or
process can be patentable subject matter. 1
Prior to the arrival of computer programs on the patent scene,
the courts had developed a test to determine whether a patent
claim defined an unpatentable abstract concept or whether it de-
fined a potentially patentable process or apparatus which applied
or used the concept. The test incorporated the "mental steps" doc-
trine with a "point of novelty" approach.42 The essence was to first
determine which steps were "mental steps" or "physical steps" in a
process or apparatus.' 3 Then a determination was made of whether
the point of novelty was in the mental or physical steps. If the
point of novelty was in physical steps then the subject matter was
patentable. Likewise, if the point of novelty was in the mental
steps then the subject matter was unpatentable." Thus, it appears
35. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
36. Id.
37. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 (1874); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156
(1852).
38. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoc. Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
39. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
40. Id. at 67.
41. "While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable
invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth
may be." Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). "He who discov-
ers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the
law recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end." Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoc.
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
42. See, e.g., In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951). The court determined that a
mathematical procedure for construction of airfoil consists of mental steps which are not
patentable subject matter.
43. "Mental steps" are those which are normally thought of as being performed by a
human mind. See In re Abramsn, 188 F.2d 165, 166-67 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
44. In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951) is a classic case demonstrating the use of
the mental steps doctrine. In Abrams, the appellant's brief proposed three "rules" for the
court to follow. Although the court did not expressly adopt the "rules" it did say that
"If]rom such examination of the decisions as we have been able to make, the suggested rules
appear to accord with them." 188 F.2d at 167.
Rule 2 stated:
If a method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as well as so-called
mental steps, yet the alleged novelty or advance over the art resides in one or
1981] CASE NOTES
that by using the mental steps and point of novelty approach to
determine the patentability of subject matter defining a computer
program, the program would be unpatentable because it is unlikely
that any steps in a program would be considered "physical" in the
sense of this test.45
The mental steps doctrine, however, was rejected by the CCPA
in In re Musgrave.4'6 Thus, its application to computer programs
never became an issue. Musgrave replaced mental steps with the
"technological arts" test.47 "All that is necessary . . . to. make a
sequence of operational steps a statutory 'process' within 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in conso-
nance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of
'useful arts.' "48
It was during the mid-sixties that legal protection for computer
programs had become an issue. In 1966, the President's Commis-
sion on the Patent System recommended that computer programs
not be afforded patent protection.49 The CCPA, however, did not
agree and in the first significant computer program related case, In
re Prater,50 said that it saw no reason why computer program re-
lated claims were necessarily unpatentable. 51
more of the so-called mental steps, then the claim is considered unpatentable for
the same reason that it would be if all the steps were purely mental in character.
Id. at 166.
45. "Prior to 1968, well-established principles of patent law probably would have pre-
vented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any conceivable computer program. Under
the mental steps doctrine, processes involving mental operations were considered unpatent-
able." 101 S. Ct. at 1060 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. 431 F.2d 882, 889 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The Supreme Court had never explicitly approved
the mental steps doctrine. Diehr is the only Supreme Court case to mention the mental
steps doctrine by name, although both Benson and Flook arguably alluded to it.
47. Id. at 893.
48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. The Commission recommended:
A series of instructions which control or condition the operation of a data process-
ing machine, generally referred to as a "program," shall not be considered patent-
able regardless of whether the program is claimed as: (a) an article, (b) a process
described in terms of the operations performed by a machine pursuant to the pro-
gram, or (c) one or more machine configurations established by a program.
Gemignani, supra note 1, at 295 (quoting from The Report of the President's Commission
on the Patent System, to Promote the Progress of. . .Useful Arts in an Age of Exploding
Technology at 12 (1966)).
50. 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). The claim involved a process for analyzing
spectographic data to produce a quantitative spectographic analysis and an apparatus for
producing the analysis, The apparatus was an analog computer, although the claimants ad-
mitted that a digital computer could be used. Id. at 1397.
51. Id. at 1403 n.29. The CCPA stated that when a program is introduced into a general
purpose digital computer that a special purpose digital computer is created and that the
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It was not until 1972 that the Supreme Court first addressed the
subject of computer program patentability. In Gottschalk v. Ben-
son,5' the CCPA had used the new technological arts test to hold
that the patent application in question defined patentable subject
matter under section 101.8 The process claimed used a computer
program to convert binary coded decimal numerals into pure bi-
nary numbers. The Supreme Court called the program an "al-
gorithm"" and analogized it to' an idea or mathematic equation. In
reversing the CCPA, the Court found that the patent "would whol-
ly preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would
be a patent on the algorithm itself,"5' and was thus not patentable
subject matter under section 101. The Court was careful to note,
however, that its decision should not be construed to hold that all
apparatus and the process by which it operates might not necessarily be unpatentable. Id.
Although Prater was decided before the complete demise of the mental steps doctrine, prior
"mental steps" cases were distinguished in Prater, thus foreshadowing the holding in Mus-
grave. See text supra, following note 46.
52. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
53. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Ben-
son, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
54. See Novick & Wallenstein, supra note 1, for an excellent explanation of the term
"algorithm." "Given the problem [to be solved] and the device [to be used in solving the
problem], an algorithm is the precise characterization of a method of solving the problem,
presented in a language comprehensible to the device." Id. at 333 (quoting from Encyclope-
dia of Computer Science 47-48 (A. Ralston & C. Meek eds. 1976)).
Although not all algorithms are mathematical, the Supreme Court has defined "al-
gorithm" to mean mathematical algorithms only. "A procedure for solving a given type of
mathematical problem is known as an 'algorithm.'" 409 U.S. at 65. A commentator
explained:
Algorithms may be created in all aspects of daily living. For example: An al-
gorithm for a person to safely lift a cup of coffee off a saucer.
(1) START;
(2) Place hand lightly on cup;
(3) If cup is not too hot to maintain contact, skip to step (7);
(4) Remove hand from cup;
(5) Cover hand with napkin-this unit is now the "hand";
(6) Return to step (2);
(7) Lift cup slightly off saucer;
(8) If cup does not begin to slip, skip to step (14);
(9) Replace cup on saucer;
(10) Remove hand from cup;
(11) Wipe clean outsides of both hand and cup;
(12) Place hand on cup;
(13) Return to step (7);
(14) Lift cup to desired height;
(15) FINISH.
Novick & Wallenstein, supra note 1, at 334 n.175.
55. 409 U.S. at 72.
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computer programs were unpatentable.56
Because the Supreme Court had decided Benson so narrowly,
and neither mentioned the mental steps doctrine nor specifically
rejected the technological arts doctrine, the CCPA had no trouble
accepting the Benson reversal. In several cases the CCPA narrowly
construed Benson and continued to hold program related claims
patentable subject matter.6 7 The CCPA insisted that the mental
steps doctrine was a dead letter and that the Patent Office practice
of dissecting claims to determine the point of novelty was wrong.58
One of the cases decided according to this reasoning was In re
Flook,59 which was reviewed by the Supreme Court as Parker v.
Flook.60
Flook involved a claim that was amazingly similar to the claim in
Diehr.11 The claimed invention in Flook was a process for updating
an "alarm limit" in the catalytic hydrocarbon conversion process.
"In essence, the process involves an initial step which reads the
parameters of the chemical process system, an intermediate step
which uses an algorithm to calculate a desired new value for the
alarm value, and a final step in which the actual alarm value is
adjusted." As in Diehr, the claim involved a programmed com-
puter which was used to make rapid recalculations due to the in-
put of changing variables, and the post-solution utilization of the
recalculated equation solutions. In Flook the post-solution activity
was the setting of a new "alarm limit" to trigger an alarm whereas
56. Id. at 71.
57. See, e.g., In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'd sub nor. Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584 (1978); In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d
152 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765
(C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
58. Throughout this period the Patent Office held the view that if the point of novelty of
a claim was a mathematical formula or algorithm it was unpatentable. An example of the
CCPA response to this view is contained in Chatfield:
Our reference ... to the mathematical equation as being at the "point of novelty"
does not equate to a holding that a claim may be dissected, the claim components
searched in the prior art, and, if the only component found novel is outside the
statutory classes of invention, the claim may be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
That procedure is neither correct nor within the intent of Congress....
545 F.2d at 158.
59. 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'd sub nor. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). See
generally 30 HASTINGs L.J. 1627 (1979); 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 975 (1979); 19 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 483 (1979); 56 U. DEr. J. URw. L. 289 (1978); and 1979 Wis. L. REV. 867.
60. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
61. 101 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens said that Diehr and Lut-
ton's "method of updating the curing time calculation is strikingly reminiscent of the
method of updating alarm limits that . . . Flook sought to patent." Id.
62. 559 F.2d at 22.
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in Diehr it was the signaling of a device to open the press.' s
Justice Stevens wrote for the Court in Flook. The Court said
that regardless of the fact that respondent's claim did not "wholly
pre-empt the mathematical formula," and that post-solution activ-
ity was present, the claim did not define patentable subject mat-
ter." The Court agreed with the CCPA that the claim should be
viewed as a whole," but said that the proper test was quite differ-
ent from the one which the CCPA had applied. The Court said
that "[the process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm,
must be new and useful. ' 6 The way to determine this, said the
Court, is to assume the algorithm (program) to be part of the
"prior art"" and then see if the process describes a patentable in-
vention. 8 The Court applied this test and found that Flook's in-
vention was not patentable.9
Although never mentioning the mental steps doctrine and point
of novelty approach, the Court in Flook apparently referred to
these when it said, "[t]o a large extent our conclusion is based on
reasoning derived from opinions written before the modern busi-
ness of developing programs for computers was conceived."70 A
strong dissenting opinion in Flook took the majority to task for
"importing into its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of
novelty and inventiveness.""' The dissent felt that the test used by
the majority had the effect of denying the patentability of the sub-
ject matter merely because one step in the process, considered in
isolation, would be unpatentable.
The dissent needn't have worried, however, since the CCPA vir-
tually ignored Flook. The CCPA continued to analyze computer
program related claims using a two step approach it had previously
63. 101 S. Ct. at 1067.
64. 437 U.S. at 589-90.
65. Id. at 594.
66. Id. at 591.
67. The term "prior art" is a term of art which comes from 35 U.S.C. § 103. Under
section 103 analysis, the subject matter sought to be patented must be compared with the
"prior art" to determine whether or not the invention was obvious. It was, perhaps, unfortu-
nate that the Court in Flook phrased its test in this way, i.e., borrowing a term of art from
section 103 analysis to use in section 101 analysis. By doing so the Court opened itself to
criticism that it was importing section 103 considerations of obviousness into section 101
analysis.
68. 437 U.S. at 591-92, 594.
69. Id. at 594.
70. Id. at 595.
71. Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See note 67 supra.
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developed in In re Freeman.72 In continuing to analyze claims us-
ing the Freeman test after the decision in Flook, the CCPA seemed
to completely disregard the Supreme Court's reasoning. The CCPA
admitted this explicitly in In re Diehr:
Although in Flook the Supreme Court assumed the equation of
the claim to be old in the art even though it was not, the holding
of that case does not depend on that mode of analysis .... While
the Supreme Court in that case may have found that analysis a
convenient vehicle to highlight the fact that Flook's actual contri-
bution to the useful arts was his new formula, we do not believe
that the Court meant to establish that analysis as a general test
in determining compliance with § 101. ... 7
The foregoing, then, was the state of the law before the Supreme
Court decided Diehr. As one commentator has eloquently put it:
[T]he state of program patents is utterly chaotic. The plot has all
of the elements of a comic opera with four principle characters:
the Patent Office, which steadfastly turns down every application
for a patent on a computer program; the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, which has fought for program patents in the face
of increasing opposition from the Supreme Court; the Supreme
Court, itself confused and trying to apply 'nineteenth century le-
gal notions to computer technology without understanding the
technology,' which keeps reversing the Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals without directly confronting the issue of program
patentability; and Congress, which despite anxious pleas from the
Supreme Court to resolve the issue by statute, does nothing.74
IV. ANALYSIS OF Diehr OPINIONS
The rationale of the majority opinion in Diehr is a complete re-
versal of the majority rationale in Flook.7" This is, of course, un-
derstandable since the Flook dissenters became the majority in
72. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Freeman was decided before Parker v. Flook. The
Freeman analysis is a two step procedure which reflects the CCPA interpretation of the
holding in Benson. Basically the test is (1) determine whether the claim recites an algorithm
and (2) if it does, then determine if it "wholly preempts" that algorithm. If not, it is patent-
able. Id. at 1245. For a case applying this test even after Parker v. Flook, see In re Diehr,
602 F.2d 982, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Diamond v. Diehr, 101 S. Ct. 1048 (1981).
73. In re Diehr, 602 F.2d at 987 n.6.
74. Gemignani, supra note 1, at 292.
75. Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 101 S. Ct. 1048 (1981) with Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Diehr through the defection of Justices White and Powell. 7 The
majority in Diehr begin their dismemberment of Flook by defining
the term "process" as used in section 101. This is important be-
cause whatever the Court determines to be the "process" is what
the Court will analyze for proper subject matter.
The Diehr majority opinion first observes that in statutory con-
struction "words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, con-
temporary, common meaning. 7 7 The Court then examines the
word "process" as used in section 101 and discusses its history and
significances.7  The Court concludes that the process involved in
Diehr and Lutton's claim is "a physical and chemical process for
molding precision synthetic rubber products" and therefore "falls
within the § 101 categories. "79
The Court's analysis of the word "process" as used in section 101
is broader than the analysis of the same word in Flook and Ben-
son. In Benson the Court said that "[t]he question is whether the
method described and claimed is a 'process' within the meaning of
the Patent Act."80 And in Flook the Court said:
The plain language of § 101 does not answer the question. It is
true, as respondent argues, that his method is a "process" in the
ordinary sense of the word. But that was also true of the al-
gorithm . .. in Gottschalk v. Benson. The holding that the dis-
covery of that method could not be patented as a "process" fore-
closes a purely literal reading of § 101.1
The Court next reaffirms the unpatentable nature of physical
phenomena and abstract ideas, stating that Benson and Flook
stand for this principle.8s In attempting to contrast Diehr and Lut-
ton's claim with these cases, the Court is careful to include in its
analysis the entire process of curing rubber, beginning with placing
uncured rubber in the mold and ending with opening the press.83
Here lies the main point of conflict between the majority and the
dissent.
The majority, in analyzing Diehr and Lutton's "process," looks
76. See notes 9 & 26 supra.
77. 101 S. Ct. at 1054 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 311, 314 (1979)).
78. 101 S. Ct. at 1054-55.
79. Id. at 1055.
80. 409 U.S. at 64 (footnote omitted).
81. 437 U.S. at 588-89 (footnotes omitted).
82. 101 S. Ct. at 1055.
83. Id. at 1056.
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at the entire process of curing rubber although it is aware that the
entire process is not the "invention. 8 4 While the claim application
recites the entire process of curing rubber,s this is merely the re-
sult of a decision on the part of the draftsman of the claim. The
true claim is the part of the process of curing rubber that Diehr
and Lutton "invented," i.e., the constant measurement and input
of temperature, the constant recalculation of the Arrhenius equa-
tion, and the use of the constantly updated solution.86
The above point forms the heart of the dissent argument. "The
starting point in the proper adjudication of patent litigation is an
understanding of what the inventor claims to have discovered. '8 7
The essence of the dissent's argument is that unless some way is
found to distinguish what an applicant's invention truly is from
what an applicant recites in his claim application, then whatever
the applicant recites in his application will be analyzed for pur-
poses of section 101. If this were the case, the section 101 analysis
would hinge entirely on the draftsman's skill.as
The majority respond to this argument by saying that to analyze
a claim by looking to what is new in the claim rather than what the
whole claim recites would inject considerations of novelty and ob-
viousness into section 101. According to the majority, these consid-
erations belong in sections 102 and 103 analysis only. Therefore,
the Court opined:
In determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process
84. The majority appears to have no greater problem than the dissent in distinguishing
the process Diehr and Lutton claim as novel from the process recited in their application.
"According to the respondents, the continuous measuring of the temperature inside the
mold cavity, the feeding of this information to a digital computer which constantly recalcu-
lates the cure time, and the signaling by the computer to open the press, are all new in the
art." Id. at 1052. Although the majority makes this distinction, it is irrelevant in view of
their holding that this distinction (between old and new elements in a claim) should not be
used in analysis of subject matter patentability.
85. Id. at 1052-53 n.5.
86. Id. at 1052.
87. Id. at 1060 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Stevens went on to
state:
The patent application filed by Diehr and Lutton, however, teaches nothing about
the chemistry of the synthetic rubber-curing process, nothing about the raw
materials to be used in curing synthetic rubber, nothing about the equipment to
be used in the process, and nothing about the significance or effect of any process
variable such as temperature, curing time, particular compositions of material, or
mold configurations. In short, Diehr and Lutton do not claim to have discovered
anything new about the process for curing synthetic rubber.
Id. at 1066.
88. Id. at 1070 n.39.
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for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be consid-
ered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old
and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old ele-
ments in the analysis. ... The "novelty" of any element or steps
in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the
§ 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.8 9
This is completely inconsistent with the reasoning of Flook.a° The
Diehr majority reads the words "new and useful" out of section
101, utilizing legislative history in support of this reasoning. 1
Thus, the majority appears satisfied that since section 102 deals
explicitly with considerations of novelty, no novelty consideration
is appropriate in section 101 analysis.
The dissent in Diehr contends that on one level novelty is an
appropriate consideration under section 101 analysis. The superior
logic of this response is inescapable. There are two completely dif-
ferent and distinguishable novelty considerations under discus-
sion.92 The major novelty question is the section 102 issue: whether
the claim is in fact novel. This is a question which can only be
answered by a court. The other novelty question, the section 101
issue, is: what does the applicant claim to be new. This question
can only be answered by the applicant.9 According to the dissent,
"the Court has compounded its error by ignoring the critical dis-
89. Id. at 1057 (footnotes omitted).
90. In Flook the Court said, "We think this case must ... be considered as if the princi-
ple or mathematical formula were well known." 437 U.S. at 592.
91. 101 S. Ct. at 1057-58. The Court stated:
The legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act is in accord with this reasoning. The
Senate Report provided:
"Section 101 sets forth the subject matter that can be patented, 'subject to
the conditions and requirement of this title.' The conditions under which a
patent may be obtained follow, and Section 102 covers the conditions relat-
ing to novelty."
It is later stated in the same report:
"Section 102, in general, may be said to describe the statutory novelty re-
quired for patentability, and includes, in effect, the amplification and defi-
nition of 'new' in Section 101."
Finally, it is stated in the "Revision Notes":
"The corresponding section of [the] existing statute is split into two sec-
tions, Section 101 relating to the subject matter for which patents may be
obtained, and Section 102 defining statutory novelty and stating other con-
ditions for patentability."
Id. at 1058 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 1060 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1068-69 n.34-36 and accompanying text.
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tinction between the character of the subject matter that the in-
ventor claims to be novel-the § 101 issue-and the question
whether that subject matter is in fact novel-the § 102 issue.""
It seems reasonable that a statute which applies only to
"[w]hoever invents or discovers..."9' should be analyzed in terms
of the applicant's actual invention, i.e., the novelty he claims, as
opposed to what is recited in the application. The application is a
product of the draftsman's art and, as was arguably done in Diehr,
the draftsman can surround the claimed invention with parts of a
larger, well-known process." By lumping these two distinquishable
concepts of "novelty" together and eliminating any consideration
of novelty from section 101 analysis, the Court opens the door of
patentable subject matter to many claims which would be unpat-
entable but for the drafting of the claim application.
Most interesting is the majority's futile effort to distinguish
Flook. The Court attempts to distinguish Flook by describing the
post-solution activity in Flook as "token."97 It is unclear why the
post-solution activity in Flook is more token than that in Diehr.
Why is "adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit
value"" considered more token than programming a computer to
"[signal] a device to open the press"? 99 Perhaps the draftsman of
the Flook claim would have done better by reciting something like
"the sounding of said alarm upon the attainment of the adjusted
alarm limit." Then, as in Diehr, the post-solution activity might
not have been considered "token." 100
94. Id. at 1060 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. See 35 U.S.C. § 101, quoted in note 4 supra.
96. Compare claim 11, 101 S. Ct. at 1052-53 n.5 with the claim in Flook, 437 U.S. at 596-
97. The Flook claim, rather than reciting the entire process of catalytic conversion, speaks
only of "A method... involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion
of hydrocarbons. . . ." 437 U.S. at 596-97 (emphasis added).
97. 101 S. Ct. at 1059.
98. 437 U.S. at 597.
99. 101 S. Ct. at 1052.
100. Blumenthal & Riter, supra note 1, provide an interesting example of how the claim
in Diehr could be redrafted into a presumably non-statutory form:
An improved method of calculating the cure time of a rubber molding process
utilizing a digital computer comprising the steps of:
a. inputting into said computer input values including
1. natural logarithm conversion data (In).
2. an activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of rubber being
molded.
3. a constant (X) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of the
press, and
4. continuous temperature values (Z) of the mold during molding;
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Another reason offered by the majority to distinguish Diehr
from Flook is that in Flook "[tihe application. . . did not purport
to explain how these other variables were to be determined, 10 1 nor
did it purport 'to contain any disclosure relating to the chemical
processes at work, the monitoring of process variables, or the
means of setting off an alarm system."'" By contrast, the Diehr
application recites where the variables of time and temperature
come from and how the press is opened after the solution is
found.'03 This is a classic example of a difference in drafting that is
form over substance.
There is, however, one substantive difference between the Flook
claim and the Diehr claim. This difference is the Diehr claim of
constant temperature measurement. 104 In Flook, none of the claims
could be regarded as a novel process for more accurately determin-
ing any of the computer input variables involved. In Diehr, how-
ever, "[r]espondents characterize their contribution to the art to
reside in the process of constantly measuring the actual tempera-
ture inside the mold.' 0 5
Analyzing this claim from the dissent point of view, one would
have to say that constant temperature measurement is, presuma-
bly, patentable subject matter since it is a physical process sepa-
rate from the computer program. Therefore, even if one considered
the program to be part of the prior art, as must be done for pur-
poses of the Flook test,'" there remains the patentable subject
matter of constant temperature measurement. The dissent recog-
nizes that if this constant temperature measurement is a novel
part of the claim, then even under Flook analysis the claim de-
b. operating said computer for
1. counting the elapsed cure time,
2. calculating the cure time from the input values using the Arrhenius equation
In V = CZ + X, where V is the total cure time, and
c. providing output signals from said computer when said calculated cure time is
equal to said elapsed cure time.
101 S. Ct. at 1068 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting from Blumenthal & Riter, supra
note 1, at 505).
101. The variables referred to are those in the formula which must comprise inputs to
the computer in order for the computer to accomplish a solution.
102. 101 S. Ct. at 1056 (footnotes omitted).
103. See note 96 supra.
104. See claim 11(f) and claim 1, at 101 S. Ct. at 1052-53 n.5.
105. Id. at 1052.
106. The test utilized by the Court in Flook and by the dissent in Diehr is basically to
consider the algorithm (computer program) to be part of the prior art and then to determine
if the process, considered as a whole, describes patentable subject matter. See 101 S. Ct. at
1070; 437 U.S. at 594.
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scribes patentable subject matter."" The dissent avoids this result,
however, by arguing that constant temperature measurement is not
part of the claim. 108
Amazingly, this point is ignored by the majority. This is appar-
ently due to the fact that under the majority test this distinction
between Diehr and Flook is irrelevant. 109 The majority must have
been anxious, nonetheless, to replace the Flook test with its own
because this point could easily have been resolved in favor of Diehr
and Lutton, while reaffirming Flook analysis.110
Of course, whether Flook is distinguished or overruled is proba-
bly immaterial since the CCPA has resisted Flook's reasoning any-
way."1 Still, the holding of Flook remains alive after Diehr; a po-
tential trap for the unwary draftsman who neither buries his
computer program within some larger and obviously patentable
process, nor includes more than "token" post-solution activity in
his recitation of the claim.
Perhaps the real, although unexpressed, rationale of Diehr is
that, notwithstanding precedent, computer programs should be
patentable. Although programs have never been held to be unpat-
entable,' this decision will undoubtedly open wide the door to
patentability. Is
107. "As the Court reads the claims in the Diehr and Lutton patent application, the
inventors' discovery is a method of constantly measuring the actual temperature inside a
rubber molding press. . . . If the Court's reading of the claims were correct, I would agree
that they disclose patentable subject matter." 101 S. Ct. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. The majority looked to the entire process of curing rubber to analyze the claim.
Therefore, the nature of any part of the claim, i.e., whether a part of the claim is old or
unpatentable for any reason, is irrelevant.
110. It would have been interesting if the majority had responded to this argument. Ar-
guably, the constant temperature measurement was a novel part of Diehr and Lutton's
claim. The CCPA opinion stated:
[Diehr and Lutton] strenuously take issue with the factual conclusion made by
both the examiner and the board that their step of continuously measuring the
temperature in the mold cavity is old in the art. They attribute this error to a
misreading of their specification and assert that they are the first to employ this
step in the molding process.
602 F.2d at 985.
111. See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
112. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 595 (referring to the need for Congress to act); Benson, 409
U.S. at 71 (decision does not preclude patents for computer programs).
113. The dissent recognizes that there is much sentiment in favor of patentability, but
feels that this question should not be addressed by the Court, thereby implying that Con-
gress should act. 101 S. Ct. at 1071 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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V. IMPACT OF DECISION
There is no doubt that computer program related processes will
be more patentable as a result of Diehr. Although the CCPA had
allowed many computer related claims, the Patent Office may now
be forced to take a more favorable view towards these claims. Al-
though not specifically allowing claims based on computer pro-
grams, the Diehr test with its broad definition of "process" under
section 101 and its prohibition against dissecting claims may keep
the Patent Office from rejecting well drafted claims on the grounds
of unpatentable subject matter. Unless the PTO Board finds a new
basis on which to reject computer program related claims, " 4 there
will be more applications filed and more patents subsequently
issued.
Thus, the major effect of Diehr may be on the Patent Office. The
dissent in Diehr observed that the motivation of the Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks in pursuing computer program related
suits may have been the Patent Office's anticipation of "the flood
of applications that would inevitably flow from a decision that
computer programs are patentable." ' The magnitude of this
"flood" and whether or not the Patent Office can absorb and han-
dle it remain to be seen.
The computer software industry will almost certainly welcome
this decision. " " Although one might expect the greatest effect of
Diehr to be on the industry, this may not be the case. Since patent
protection has been largely unavailable, the software industry has
utilized copyright and trade secret law in an effort to protect its
wares.117 Even though it appears that patents are a better protec-
tion than copyrights for programs, " 8 at least one commentator
feels that patent protection for programs is not a cure all and that
dramatic effects on the industry cannot be expected to follow
114. Even though a claim satisfies section 101 it can still be defeated under other sec-
tions. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d at 1399 (patent examiner had rejected applicant's claim
partially on grounds relating to 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976)).
115. 101 S. Ct. at 1072 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
116. Id. at 1071 n.42 and accompanying text.
117. Programs are being copyrighted under 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976) even though they are
not specifically mentioned in the copyright law. See Gemignani, supra note 1, at 281 n.61
and accompanying text.
Trade Secret law has been the major source of protection for the industry but like both
copyright and patent protection it too has drawbacks. See generally, Gemignani, supra note
1, at 304-07; Nimtz, supra note 1, at 19-21; Pope & Pope, supra note 1, at 532-34.
118. See Maser v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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patentability. 119
VI. CONCLUSION
Like earlier Supreme Court decisions, Diehr says neither yea nor
nay to the underlying question of whether computer programs are
patentable. Unlike previous decisions, Diehr leans in favor of pat-
entability. Diehr establishes a new test for determining patentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 which is much broader and
more liberal than previous Court approved tests. Although the
Court did not overrule Parker v. Flook, Diehr torpedoes Flook's
rationale, thereby leaving Flook afloat but dead in the water, a der-
elict trap for the unwary. Under Diehr the key to whether a com-
puter program related patent application defines patentable sub-
ject matter appears to reside in the skill and competency of the
draftsman. If the application recites a process larger than the pro-
gram itself, then the application will define patentable subject
matter regardless of old or obvious aspects of the process recited.
PAUL D. JEss
Taxation-DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE ENTITY-PARTNERS UN-
ABLE TO IGNORE EXISTENCE OF CORPORATION USED FOR FINANCING
PuRosEs--Ogiony v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1980).
The Ogionys joined a group of investors intending to develop
rental apartment projects in Cheektowaga, New York.1 In 1966, the
investors formed Garden Village Partnership (Garden Partnership)
for the purpose of constructing the apartment complex, Garden
Village. 2 Three years later, the building of another apartment com-
plex, Losson Gardens, was begun through a newly organized part-
nership, Losson Gardens Company (Losson Partnership).' Financ-
ing of the projects proved difficult. Because the market interest
rate for nonresidential mortgages exceeded the maximum rate that
119. See Gemignani, supra note 1, at 301-04.
1. Ogiony v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 125,126, afld, 617 F.2d 14, 80-1 U.S.T.C.
9265 (2d Cir. 1980). The group of investors comprised other individuals besides the
Ogionys. Their individual claims were consolidated in trial. 38 T.C.M. at 125, n.1.
2. Id. at 126.
3. Id. at 130.
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